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ABSTRACT 
State Defense Forces (SDFs), or organized state militias and naval militias, have a long 
and distinguished history of service in the United States. These state-sanctioned 
organizations are substantiated and legitimized through the U.S. justice system and 
constitutional law. Currently, 23 states and U.S. territories have SDFs; unlike National 
Guard units, they cannot be federalized, which means they remain a state-level asset 
during emergency management operations. SDFs were utilized successfully during 
Hurricane Katrina, proving their value in state and federal emergency response efforts.  
This thesis seeks to analyze the structure and usefulness of the SDF as a volunteer 
emergency response organization. Second, it seeks to understand the evolution of the 
SDF by examining U.S. militia history. Third, it examines the disaster-relief efforts of 
SDFs with regard to Hurricane Katrina. SDFs provide state governors with emergency 
response personnel who are locally available and ready to serve in multiple capacities. 
Presently, state officials can promote legislation and develop a mission-flexible State 
Defense Force that can act as a reserve force for local law enforcement and the National 
Guard during natural and man-made disasters. The SDF may be the next step in the 
evolution of state and local emergency response in the 21st century.  
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SDFs are a low-cost, high-payoff asset, yet many states do not maintain 
them. Judging by more than 50 years of actuarial data, states such as 
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina and 
Pennsylvania have a historically “high risk” of natural disasters. Yet none 
of those seven states has an SDF.1 
State Defense Forces (SDFs), or Organized State Militias and Naval Militias, 
have a long and distinguished history of service in the United States. These state-
sanctioned organizations are substantiated and legitimized through the U.S. justice 
system and constitutional law. Currently, 23 states and U.S. territories have SDFs; unlike 
National Guard units, they cannot be federalized, which means they remain a state-level 
asset during emergency management operations.2  
State Defense Forces were instrumental in the emergency response after the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and during Hurricane Katrina, proving their value in state 
and federal emergency response efforts.3 Based on such experiences, scholars suggest 
that more states should use these SDFs more extensively to aid counterterrorism efforts 
and local natural or man-made disaster response, especially because “the federal 
government usually needs 72 hours to marshal national resources to respond to an 
incident that has surpassed a state’s response capacity.”4 And yet these organizations are 
little known and underutilized. 
James Jay Carafano suggests that SDFs face certain public-relations challenges 
that may account for some states not utilizing these organizations. Indeed, many within 
the U.S. population—citizens and state-level leaders alike—do not know these 
1 James J. Carafano, “State Defense Forces Provide Professionalism on the Cheap,” Family Security 
Matters, January 10, 2015, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.7744/pub_detail.asp. 
2 Arthur Tulak, Robert Kraft, and Don Silbaugh, “State Defense Forces and Homeland Security,” 
Parameters 33, no. 2 (Winter 2003–04): 137. 
3 Ibid., 133. 
4 Jill D. Rhodes and James Jay Carafano, “State and Regional Response to Disasters: Solving the 72-
hour Problem,” Heritage Foundation, August 21, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/08/ 
state-and-regional-responses-to-disasters-solving-the-72-hour-problem#_ftn2. 
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organizations exist. Perhaps worse, Carafano notes that even those who are aware of 
SDFs often mistake them for Patriot Militias or other radical, anti-government 
organizations.”5 There are militias and then there are militias; the designation of “State 
Defense Force” marks a key distinction in these groups’ purposes, workings, and 
relationships with the populations and the governments they serve. The distinction—as 
well as the unique opportunity that SDFs present to states in the form of nimble and 
locally savvy emergency response personnel who are less constrained by Posse 
Comitatus and who are close at hand—means that State Defense Forces should figure 
more prominently in national and state emergency response planning.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must “ensure a homeland that is 
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”6 This mission includes 
working with state administrations to respond with maximum effect to any threats to 
Americans and their way of life. It is a monumental task, and both the states and the 
federal authorities could use all the help they can get. SDFs are often ready, willing, able, 
and trained for such work. Thus, the primary research question for this thesis is: How can 
states best integrate State Defense Forces to complement infrastructure defense, 
counterterrorism efforts, and natural disaster-relief planning?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
1. Economic Importance 
The vast territory within the United States presents DHS with a logistical 
challenge with regard to coordinating emergency management with states that are 
struggling to balance budgets and resolve multiple manpower issues. States can be too 
5 James J. Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces and 
Homeland Security,” Heritage Foundation, October 8, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2010/10/the-21st-century-militia-state-defense-forces-and-homeland-security; “Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in 
the United States in 2011,” Southern Poverty Law Center, http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/active-patriot-groups-in-the-united-states. 
6 “Our Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, December 17, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/our-
mission. 
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quick to declare emergencies through the FEMA declaration process because they do not 
have sufficient manning or funding for their emergency response programs.7 As a recent 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report admonishes, “too low a threshold [to 
request federal aid] reinforces the perception that the federal government will always 
come like the cavalry to rescue states and local governments from their improvident 
failure to prepare for routine disasters.”8 Ongoing financial pressures have caused states 
to take drastic measures to balance their budgets. According to the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, “the measures that states used to close their budget gaps, combined with 
the severity of the fiscal crisis that states faced, suggest that state services will remain at 
risk for a number of years.”9  
Moreover, “the steep spending cuts of the last few years have caused declines in 
virtually all services provided by states.”10 Using SDFs and other volunteer organizations 
could help alleviate some of this financial burden and provide much-needed emergency 
response, especially within the first 72 hours, when federal aid may not be available. 
State Defense Forces could help fill the gap so that state response could be sufficient to 
local emergencies, and federal aid could be saved for greater disasters elsewhere in the 
nation. 
2. Political and Historical Importance 
Certain states may not have formed SDFs because of the negative associations of 
the terms state militia and right-wing Patriot Militias.11 Carafano suggests that “[o]ften 
those who are aware of SDFs confuse them with private militia forces associated with 
7 Francis X. McCarthy, FEMA’s Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer (CRS Report No. RL34146). 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1–5, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL 
34146.pdf. 
8 McCarthy, FEMA’s Disaster Declaration Process, 17. 
9 Elizabeth McNichol, “Out of Balance: Cuts in Services Have Been States’ Primary Response to 
Budget Gaps, Harming the Nation’s Economy,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, April 18, 2012, 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3747. 
10 Ibid. 
11 “Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in the United States in 2011.” 
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radical organizations.”12 The history of the militia provided in this thesis may help state 
officials understand the evolution of the SDF and therefore draw a bright line of 
distinction between unauthorized militias and legitimate, state-sectioned SDFs, which 
operate within the bounds of federal and state law. That is, SDFs are not Patriot Militias 
but state-sanctioned volunteer organizations that provide state defense when the National 
Guard is deployed or local emergency response when called upon by the governor. A 
discussion has also been included in the appendix to further explore the ideology of 
Patriot Militias and how they differ from SDFs. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Particularly now, after a spate of mass shootings, gun control is at the top of 
political agendas. SDFs could face greater restrictions and resistance if federal gun 
control legislation is promulgated in the near future, especially if officials believe that 
SDFs and other radical militias are one and the same, which in turn can influence state 
officials to steer away from SDF sanction and support, thereby separating the state from 
these valuable local emergency responders. Probing every aspect of SDFs and 
understanding militia history may be the best way to counter current biases and to 
increase SDF legitimacy in the eyes of the U.S. population. By probing state legal 
documents, reviewing the Militia Acts of 1792 and 1903, and analyzing the utilization of 
militias from the Revolutionary War to the present, a clear legal framework can be 
established to enhance SDFs in the eyes of state and federal legislators and the U.S. 
population. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis concentrates on the history, organizational structure, composition, and 
integration of SDFs into the emergency response framework. Moreover, it attempts to 
differentiate SDFs from other types of militia groups and delve into the constitutional 
intricacies with regard to both organizations. This research relies on primary sources, 
12 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces and Homeland 
Security.” 
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secondary sources, unclassified government publications, scholarly books, websites, and 
academic journals.  
It also uses the response to Hurricane Katrina as a case study. During Hurricane 
Katrina, multiple SDFs from eight states were used to supplement National Guard units 
and provide security at shelters, making them an integral part of the relief effort.13 
Analyzing unclassified military, state, and federal after-action reports from these two 
events can shed light on appropriate SDF utilization. Similarly, such an analysis of these 
primary and secondary sources supports the examination of how SDFs can be integrated 
with the U.S. military and National Guard forces to aid in emergency management efforts 
and disaster relief.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I introduced the thesis. Chapter II centers on the structure and 
composition of SDFs. Chapters III, IV, and V cover militia history from the early 
colonial period to the present, concentrating on key moments in history that define the 
role of the militia in the United States. Chapter VI analyzes the SDF’s role in Hurricane 
Katrina disaster response. Chapter VII provides a conclusion. The appendix includes a 
discussion on Patriot Militias and how they differ from SDFs. 
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II. STATE DEFENSE FORCES: AN OVERVIEW 
In addition to its National Guard, if any, a State, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, or the Virgin Islands may, as 
provided by its laws, organize and maintain defense forces. A defense 
force established under this section may be used within the jurisdiction 
concerned, as its chief executive (or commanding general in the case of 
the District of Columbia) considers necessary, but it may not be called, 
ordered, or drafted into the armed forces.14  
— Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (C) 
State Defense Forces, commonly referred to as Organized State Militias or in 
some circumstances State Guards and Naval Militias, are an economical and efficient 
resource available to their respective state governor when military forces are required and 
the National Guard (NG) is either undermanned, federalized by the president under the 
Stafford Act, deployed in support of federal forces, or eliminated by a foreign enemy.15 
Unlike the U.S. federal forces, NG, and other U.S. military reserve units, SDFs remain 
under their governor’s authority at all times and cannot be federalized. Additionally, 
SDFs can be deployed to other states, through governor’s decree, to serve in response to 
natural catastrophes or man-made disasters, or anytime when a military presence may be 
needed to reestablish social control.16  
Currently, 23 states have established state guards, with a total membership of over 
14,000 in the United States and its territories (See Figure 1).17 States are federally 
authorized to maintain SDFs per Title 32 U.S.C. § 109. They have used these volunteer 
organizations to support to their NGs during events such as Hurricane Katrina, when nine 
states’ governors activated their SDFs to provide emergency assistance. Similarly, after 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (9/11), “the New York Guard, New York Naval 
14 Maintenance of Other Troops, Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (1958). 
15 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces and Homeland 
Security.”  
16 Ibid. 
17 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense Force 
(Department of Defense Report No. DODIG-2014-065) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014). 
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Militia, and New Jersey Naval Militia were activated to assist in response measures, 
recovery efforts, and critical infrastructure security.”18  
 
Figure 1.  Location of SDFs as of March 2014.19 
Government officials learned in the aftermath of 9/11 that disasters can and do 
occur with little or no warning. With federal response times taking nearly 72 hours, “local 
leaders can achieve a great deal at little cost if they invest only a modest amount of effort 
in establishing, organizing or revitalizing their SDF capabilities.”20 Even more, SDFs are 
particularly useful when a state’s National Guard units are deployed, which in part 
impeded the NG during Hurricane Katrina.21 
18 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces and Homeland 
Security.”   
19 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense Force. 
20 James J. Carafano, “A Well Regulated Militia,” The American Legion Magazine, April 1, 2008, 
http://www.legion.org/magazine/1533/well-regulated-militia. 
21 Bryan Bender, “Demands of Wars Since 9/11 Strain National Guard’s efforts,” Boston Globe, 
September 2, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/09/02/demands_of_ 
wars_since_911_strain_national_guards_efforts/. 
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Even though many states have sanctioned SDFs, these groups are often 
underfunded and underappreciated.22 Despite these handicaps, SDFs are trained and 
ready to perform a myriad of functions ranging from guarding commemorative events to 
aiding in disaster relief efforts.23 Members have professional backgrounds, and many 
within these forces “contain a significant number of former and retired members of the 
armed forces, as well as accredited and state-licensed medical, legal, and other technical 
professionals.”24 This chapter highlights the SDFs’ unique composition, chain of 
command, NG interaction, and mission set with regard to respective states.  
Ultimately, government officials who are ardently seeking ways to trim state 
budgets for government services may wish to take pause and consider the usefulness of 
SDFs. Carafano suggests that “with state coffers pressed for cash and homeland security 
grants likely to shrink . . . all states should be pursuing low-cost, high-yield, common-
sense measures to ensure they’ll be ready when disaster strikes. Establishing or 
expanding SDFs is a great way to go.”25  
A. SDF COMPOSITION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE 
The Adjutant General (TAG), is a member of the governor’s cabinet, and acts as 
the state’s senior military commander.26 Also, TAG is in charge of regulating 
recruitment, training, equipment utilization, and coordination of the SDFs with the state’s 
National Guard in case emergency relief efforts are needed. SDFs are structurally similar 
to a NG unit. Specifically, they are composed of a Commanding General, Deputy 
Commander, and Chief of Staff. The Heritage Foundation suggests that SDFs consist of 
two to five battalions with units such as medical, legal, and engineering regiments. 
22 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces and Homeland 
Security.”   
23 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense Force. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Carafano, “State Defense Forces Provide Professionalism on the Cheap.” 
26 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia: State Defense Forces and Homeland 
Security.”   
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Volunteer chaplains, a band, and a cavalry should also be available and be an integral 
part of any SDF.27  
A review of the Tennessee State Guard (TSG) structure offers a good example of 
how to organize an SDF. The TSG is the “all-volunteer arm of the Tennessee Military 
Department, and is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated 58-1-401.”28 This 500-
member force is currently under the command of Brigadier General Kenneth T. Takasaki, 
who is under the command of TAG, Major General Terry M. Haston. The Tennessee 
TAG “is responsible for the supervision of the Military Department of Tennessee that 
includes the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, the Tennessee Emergency 
Management Agency, and the Tennessee State Guard.”29 The TSG has a Directorate 
Headquarters that commands the 2nd Battalion; the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Regiments; and the 
Medical Command. The command structure is as follows:  
 
Directorate Headquarters Offices30 
 
Directorate of Personnel Administration Directorate of Plans, Ops and TNG 
Directorate of Security and Intelligence Directorate of Logistics 
Directorate of Civil/Military Support  Directorate of Communications 
Directorate of Engineering Services  Directorate of Information Services 
Headquarters Commandant   Headquarters Surgeon Section 
Secretary to the General Staff   Judge Advocate General Staff 
Office of the Inspector General  Provost Marshal 
Special Operations (SAR) Branch  TNSG Academy 





27 Jessica Zuckerman et al., “Why More States Should Establish State Defense Forces,” Heritage 
Foundation, February 28, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/why-more-states-should-
establish-state-defense-forces. 
28 “The All-Volunteer Tennessee State Guard,” Tennessee National Guard, accessed September 15, 
2014, http://www.tnmilitary.org/tennessee-state-guard.html. 
29 “The Adjutant General Tennessee National Guard,” accessed September 15, 2014, Tennessee 
National Guard, http://www.tnmilitary.org/the-adjutant-general.html. 
30 “Tennessee State Guard Units,” Tennessee National Guard, accessed September 15, 2014, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20140112225521/http://www.tnmilitary.org/SGUnits.html. 
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2nd Battalion31 
Officer Leadership 
Deputy Commanding General 
Brigade Commander 
Brigade Executive Officer 
Brigade Command Sergeant Major 
 
Enlisted Leadership 
Brigade Command Sergeant Major 
2nd Regiment has its headquarters in Nashville, TN, and commands the 





Deputy Commanding General 
Regiment Commander 
Regiment Executive Officer 
 
Enlisted Leadership 
Regiment Command Sergeant Major 
 
1st Regiment is headquartered in Jackson, TN, and commands the “1st 
Infantry Battalion, Millington; 2nd MP Battalion, Jackson; 3rd MP 






Deputy Commanding General 
Regiment Commander 
Regiment Executive Officer 
 
Enlisted Leadership 
Regiment Command Sergeant Major 
 
31 Ibid. 





                                                 
1st Regiment is headquartered in Jackson, TN, and commands the “1st 
Infantry Battalion, Gray; 2nd MP Battalion, Jefferson City; 3rd MP 






Deputy Commanding General 
Regiment Commander 
Regiment Executive Officer 
 
Enlisted Leadership 
Regiment Command Sergeant Major 
 
1st Regiment is headquartered in Jackson, TN, and commands the “1st 
Infantry Battalion, Chattanooga; 2nd MP Battalion, Cleveland; 3rd MP 




2nd Battalion and the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Regiments each have a staff 
surgeon and a medical staff. 39 
 
B. SDF AND NATIONAL GUARD INTERACTION AND ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS 
In 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) produced 
Report No. DODIG-2014-065, “Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with 
State Defense Force,” which evaluated the effectiveness of interaction between SDFs, the 
National Guard, and the U.S. Department of Defense; two areas of weakness were 
identified.40 First, regulations and federal laws were misconstrued by state organizations, 
minimizing the effectiveness of joint SDF and NG operations. Second, the National 
Guard policy regarding SDF utilization was extremely limited, resulting in 
36 Ibid. 
37 “Tennessee State Guard Units.” 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense Force. 
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misunderstandings during mission planning due to the lack of federal and state guidance 
for the NG on how to utilize the SDF. 41  
SDFs and National Guard units are both considered part of a state’s organized 
militia. SDF members and NG forces work together in conjunction during disaster relief 
operations or any other mission when directed by the Adjutant General; however, 
individuals are prohibited from serving in both organizations simultaneously. 42 Per Title 
32 U.S.C. § 109 (e), “A person may not become a member of a defense force established 
under subsection (c) if he is a member of a reserve component of the armed forces.” 43 
According to the DOD IG, this separation of SDF and NG was compounded by 
the misinterpretation of Title 32. The report found that this federal law implied that SDFs 
were forbidden from utilizing any federal equipment or supplies, which in turn led to 
states restricting SDFs’ involvement with the NG operations. Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (d) 
affirms the following: 
(d) A member of a defense force established under subsection (c) is not, 
because of that membership, exempt from service in the armed forces, nor 
is he entitled to pay, allowances, subsistence, transportation, or medical 
care or treatment, from funds of the United States.44 
The interpretation of this law, according to the IG, is that SDF members cannot 
receive pensions, healthcare, bonuses, or any other type of federal benefits. The IG states 
that these restrictions can be misconstrued and interpreted by states to mean that they 
should restrict SDF members from utilizing federally funded facilities or equipment, 
which in turn inhibits SDFs from completing missions with NG units. If equipment is 
shared, it should be the decision of TAG in accordance to the guidance of the fiscal 
officer of the state, and not predicated on Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (d). Unfortunately, there 
remains a misconception that SDFs are prohibited from using federal equipment and 
41 Ibid. 
42 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense Force. 
43 Maintenance of other Troops, Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (1958). 
44 Ibid.  
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facilities, and some states have therefore prohibited SDFs from carrying out missions in 
parallel with the National Guard.45  
This misunderstanding is not limited to just the NG, as the DOD also has 
misapprehensions with regard to SDFs. The Inspector General determined that “the 
interaction between DOD and the 23 SDF was not properly defined.”46 As previously 
stated, the DOD is restricted in its ability to provide aid to these forces with regard to 
benefits associated with the service, such as pensions or medical benefits. Further 
findings suggest that although SDFs are primarily voluntary, they are still entitled to 
access federal equipment, assets, or funds possessed by DOD.  
The challenge rests in the lack of procedural processes between SDFs and the 
DOD that clarify how the organizations are to interact. The report states that “the only 
current policies directly addressing SDF was National Guard Regulation 10-4, 
Organization and Functions: National Guard Interactions with State Defense Forces. 
Regrettably, this regulation is only applicable to the NG, and Army Regulation 670-1, 
The Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia.”47 
Consequently, the IG recommended researching the legal parameters regarding 
the interaction between the DOD and SDFs, and that the Secretary of the Defense should 
outline procedural guidance concerning the SDFs’ utilization of federal resources. 
Moreover, the IG recommends that the DOD should officially recognize SDFs “as any 
other state agency with respect to State Defense Forces preparation for and participation 
in Federal responses.”48 The Undersecretary of Defense accepted the uniqueness of SDFs 
but was reluctant to provide further procedures regarding SDF and DOD cooperation; 
however, the undersecretary did agree that SDFs should be given the same consideration 
as any other DOD asset. 49  






                                                 
Despite these challenges, SDFs have proven beneficial to state governors during 
natural or man-made disasters, as observed during 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. SDF 
training and correct interpretation of federal fiscal laws will ensure effective interaction 
between SDFs and the NG during emergent operations.50 
C. POSSE COMITATUS ADVANTAGE 
SDFs are not restricted by the “Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits federal 
military forces from engaging in domestic law enforcement activities within the United 
States.”51 On the contrary, a military force like U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) is restricted in its ability to operate within U.S. national boundaries, 
even though they are designated “to provide command and control of . . . homeland 
defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities.”52 This double bind 
affects all aspects of a domestic response. For example, during incidents of civil unrest 
that may occur due to natural disaster, U.S. armed forces personnel may be limited by 
Posse Comitatus, but SDF forces can supplement law enforcement without violating 
American civil rights; as National Guard regulations state, SDFs or state militias “may 
not be controlled or commanded by federal authorities, and missions are identified only 
by appropriate state officials.”53  
Moreover, “while the National Guard is a dual-apportioned force that can be 
called to federal service under Title 10 or remain a state force under Title 32, State 
Defense Forces serve solely as Title 32 forces.”54 For this reason they are easier for state 
administrations to deal with on a legal basis in support of state and federal 
administrations in times of crisis. Moreover, in Joint Publication 3-27, SDFs are referred 
50 Zuckerman et al., “Why More States Should Establish State Defense Forces.”  
51 Ibid.  
52 “About USNORTHCOM,” U.S. Northern Command, accessed September 15, 2013, 
http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx. 
53 “National Guard Interaction with State Defense Forces,” National Guard Regulation 10–4, 
November 2, 2011, http://www.ngbpdc.ngb.army.mil/pubs/10/ngr10_4.pdf. 
54 Zuckerman et al., “Why More States Should Establish State Defense Forces.” 
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to as auxiliary organizations that can be utilized if the National Guard becomes 
federalized.55 According to JP-3-27: 
The National Strategy for HS assigns to the states and localities the 
primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and operating the 
emergency services in the event of a terrorist attack. Given the dual-
apportioned character of the NG, some see the State Defense Forces as the 
ultimate guarantor to the states and territories to handle state-specific 
missions in the event the NG is federalized. 56  
Describing SDFs as the ultimate guarantor to handle emergencies may be an 
exaggeration, considering that there is no standardization across states and that the 
number of force personnel and their experience levels vary dramatically. But this 
literature indicates SDFs are recognized by the U.S. Department of Defense as legitimate 
and useful participants in American homeland security and defense.57  





                                                 
III. THE COLONIAL MILITIA—THE GENESIS OF THE STATE 
DEFENSE FORCE 
Contrary to the implication of much traditional writing on the subject, 
military history does not occur in a vacuum. When its study is set in its 
social, political, economic, and even intellectual context, non-military 
historians will begin to pay attention to what it can teach them. The 
colonial period is no exception.58 
—John Shy 
Understanding the evolution of the term militia, within the confines of U.S. 
history and U.S. federal and state statutory law, is paramount to understanding the 
position and purpose of contemporary State Defense Forces. The definition of “militia” 
has evolved over the past four centuries, and its use and misuse has created confusion and 
established certain stereotypes for the American public, owing in part to the term’s 
nostalgic ties to the American Revolution and to its use by Patriot Militias who use 
propaganda and misrepresentation of history for their own political ends.59 Other 
qualifiers such as “organized” and “unorganized militia,” “volunteer militia,” and “state 
militia” also add to misconceptions and misperceptions.  
This chapter reviews the philosophical and historical development of American 
militias from the colonial period up to the French and Indian War in order to better 
understand how these early militias eventually developed into the National Guard and the 
modern SDF. 
A. THE EARLY COLONIAL MILITIA 1607–1754 
Based on the fear of despotism, early colonial leaders avoided the idea of a 
standing army that could offer protection from their most prevalent threat, the American 
Indian, who disregarded European warfare tactics and utilized “a military system of his 
58 John W. Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990). CH 2 Kindle Edition. 
59 “Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in the United States in 2011.” 
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own.”60 Indians used concealment, camouflage, and guerrilla tactics to quell colonial 
migration westward into tribal lands. Unfortunately, the English policy of salutary 
neglect61 left the colonists mostly to fend for themselves, and even if England had 
supplied an abundance of British regulars, their linear warfare tactics would have been 
inadequate due to the vast forests of the Americas, a problem highlighted at the Battle of 
the Monongahela in 1758.62 Therefore, instead of establishing a standing colonial army, 
local governments relied on the English tradition of the militia, which evolved from the 
Saxon fyrd, a system of security that slowly integrated into England after the Norman 
Conquest in the 11th century.63  
Colonial governments soon requested every “able-bodied free male from sixteen 
to sixty to render military service. Each member of the militia was obligated to appear for 
training . . . [and to] provide himself with weapons, and to hold himself in readiness for 
call in case of Indian attack or other emergency.”64 On December 13, 1636, the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony held the first muster of its militia; the date is now celebrated 
60 Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, Vol. 1: The United States Army and the 
Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009), 30–33, 
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/030/30-21/index.html. 
61 British Salutary Neglect, a term coined by British philosopher Edmund Burke, was a colonial policy 
in the Americas from 1714 to 1760 that allowed for limited governmental involvement with regard to 
internal affairs of colonies. This initial taste of self-government by the colonists was the initial foundation 
of the Revolution; see James A. Henretta, Rebecca Edwards, and Robert O. Self, America: A Concise 
History, Combined Volume, 5th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin, 2012), 89. 
62 Rene Chartrand, Monongahela 1754–55: Washington’s Defeat, Braddock’s Disaster (Oxford: 
Osprey Publishing, 2013), 62–6. The Battle of the Monongahela, which occurred on July 9, 1755, saw the 
defeat of 1,300 British regulars under the command of General Edward Braddock. The French Captain 
Daniel Hyacinthe Liénard de Beaujeu led 300 men, including Indian allies, and used surprise and superior 
woodland tactics to his advantage; Beaujeu wore Indian war dress and applied paint to his face. George 
Washington was present and described the battle in a letter to his mother: “[W]e were attacked by a party of 
French and Indians, whose number, I am persuaded, did not exceed three hundred men; while ours 
consisted of about one thousand three hundred well-armed troops, chiefly regular soldiers, who were struck 
with such a panic that they behaved with more cowardice than it is possible to conceive.” See Jared Sparks, 
Official Letters Relating to the French War, and Private Letters Before the American Revolution, 1754–
May 1775 (Boston: Hilliard, Gray and Company, 1834), 87. 
63 The Saxon fyrd evolved from the ancient Saxon tradition of Allegiance, which was an order of Pagi. 
Each Pagus was required to send forth 100 warriors from his land when requested, which most likely 
required all the able-bodied men available to the Pagus. See Dudley J. Medley, A Student’s Manual of 
English Constitutional History (London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1894), 418; and Stephen Morillo, 
Warfare Under the Anglo Norman Kings 1066–1135 (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1994), 66–9; Stewart, 
American Military History, 30–33. 
64 Stewart, American Military History, 30–33.  
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as the birthday of the American National Guard. Yet the militia that took part in the first 
muster is also a distant relation of the modern SDF.65  
At that time the colonies were not under federal leadership and generally operated 
independently in each colony under salutary neglect. Each colony had compulsory militia 
service except for Pennsylvania, which finally passed its first militia legislation in 1755; 
its militia was completely voluntary, just like the SDF.66 Nonetheless, the militia was 
promulgated by distinctly separate colonial legislators, similar to the current state 
legislative systems that have passed statutes for the creation and maintenance of their 
respective militias, NG and SDF alike; hence, the National Guard perhaps should share a 
birthday with the SDF, and they should become symbolic brothers-in-arms. 67 
By 1755, each colony had individually promulgated militia service and mainly 
used its force for “protecting or extending its own frontiers.”68 The colonies had their 
own colonial assemblies that elected officers, who typically were chosen by popularity or 
their ability to bring men together and face whatever conflict arose to threaten the well-
being of the colony.69  
Additionally, “rank in the militia generally corresponded with social station in the 
community.”70 Social standing became an important aspect in choosing which able-
bodied men to send into conflict. Outsiders, men without families, and the poor and 
indigent were sent first.71 Historians, at times, may have overlooked these social and 
cultural effects when analyzing the history of the men who made up the colonial militias. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Stewart, ed. American Military History, 30–3; J. Revell Carr, Seeds of Discontent: The Deep Roots 
of the American Revolution, 1650–1750 (New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2008), 127. 
67 Stewart, American Military History, 30–33.  
68 Ibid., 30. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid., 30–41 
71 Kyle Zelner succinctly and imaginatively offers a view of obligatory service during the colonial 
period that is truly enlightening and sheds new light on the social influences that impacted the military 
sector during the colonial era; his work is key to understanding the stereotype of the undisciplined colonial 
militia; see Kyle F. Zelner, A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen During King Philip’s 
War (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 1–3. 
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The men were not part of an elite group of well-armed, well-trained military soldiers 
hardened by the trials of lethal combat—most were simply the undesirables of the 
colonies. This point appears obvious in hindsight, but it should be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the statements by the founding fathers with regard to the 
bad discipline and unreliability of militias during the French and Indian War and into the 
Revolutionary War.72 
B. ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY 
In addition to social and cultural insights into compulsory militia service, political 
philosophy also influenced the development of the militia system in the colonies—why 
did the colonists choose to utilize militias rather than create a standing army? Colonial 
utilization of militias followed with the contemporaneous philosophy of the English 
landed classes—they were adamantly opposed to standing armies.73 In the late 17th 
century, English politicians and the landed gentry considered permanent armies a threat 
to very existence of liberty and that they “were the fount of all evil responsible for 
arbitrary government, absolutism, and aggressive [C]atholicism.”74 A monarch with a 
standing army at his disposal was not only a threat to the authority of the lords and 
commons but also a threat to the concept of English liberty. Standing armies were 
“wreckers of parliaments and representative institutions, the destroyers of individual 
liberty, and a threat to the vested interests and political franchises of the English landed 
classes.”75 
72 Zelner, A Rabble in Arms; Henretta, et al., America: A Concise History, 89. 
73 John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689–1702 (Manchester: University of Manchester 
Press, 1990), 184. 
74 “James II: 1685–1688,” The British Monarchy, accessed October 25, 2014. 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/HistoryoftheMonarchy/KingsandQueensoftheUnitedKingdom/TheStuarts/JamesII
.aspx; John Childs, The British Army of William III. 
75 Childs, The British Army of William III; Stewart, American Military History, 30–41; Robert K. 
Wright and Morris J. MacGregor, “The Constitution,” Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution, U.S. Army 
Center of Military History, U.S. Army, August 11, 2000, 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/RevWar/ss/ch4.htm. 
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These ideas centered on individual liberty, freedom from absolutism, and inherent 
distrust of oppressive monarchs with unchecked military power are conveyed in the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to 
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed, —That whenever any Form 
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
People to alter or to abolish it.76 
Colonists needed to adapt to the threat that was most prevalent and find a way to 
continue their lives, provide security for their families, and protect all others in their 
respective colony without help from a standing British Army.77 
Before the birth of the United States, each colonial government chose the militia 
system to provide civic protection not only because of salutary neglect but also due to 
their British philosophical roots. Colonials—now a new British landed class in 
America—were influenced by English philosophies and were eagerly engaging in “life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Of course, even this phrase was gleaned from the 
famous English political philosopher John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government, 
which states that “Man . . . hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his property, that 
is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of other men.”78 
C. COLONIAL MILITIAS AND THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR  
The French and Indian War (1754–1763) prompted more cooperation between 
colonial militias and paved the way for the future general of the Colonial Army, George 
76 “The Declaration of Independence,” UShistory.org, July 4, 1995, 
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/document/. 
77 Stewart, American Military History, 37–9; Chartrand, Monongahela 1754–55, 62–6. 
7878 John Locke, The Works of John Locke, Vol. 5, Two Treatises of Government [1689], prepared by 
Rod Hay for the McMaster University Archive (London: n.p., 1823), http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ 
ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf; Stewart, American Military History, 30–39. 
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Washington, to gain valuable military experience.79 Washington commanded militia 
forces throughout the conflict in conjunction with the British regulars to halt French 
expansion into British territory. Washington’s performance was lackluster, considering 
his failure at Fort Necessity, and even more, during the expedition to take Fort Duquesne 
in 1758, where General Braddock’s army was decimated by French and Indian forces. 
Despite these failures, Virginia’s Governor Robert Dinwiddie placed Washington in 
command of all Virginia militia forces in order to provide protection for the northern 
frontier. The militia was made up entirely of colonials who were “inclined to be highly 
individualistic and to resent discipline and the inevitable restrictions of military life.”80 
Men wished to be free to concentrate on their own ambitions, so when they entered into 
the militia, they “did so with the idea of winning victory as quickly as possible so they 
could return to his normal civilian pursuits.”81  
Washington, hoping someday to receive a British commission, often complained 
of working with the undisciplined militia. In a letter to Dinwiddie he noted: 
The militia are under such bad order and discipline, that they will go and 
come when and where they please, without regarding time, their officers, 
or the safety of the inhabitants, consulting solely their own inclinations. . . 
. I scorn to make unjust remarks on the behaviour [sic] of the militia . . . I 
only want to make the Country sensible, how ardently I have studied to 
promote her cause; & wish very sincerely my Successor may fill my place, 
more to their satisfaction in every respect than I have been able to do.82  
Despite Washington’s views, toward the end of the war, he and the Virginia militia 
returned to Fort Duquesne with British forces and reclaimed the area from the French.83  
79 Colonial militias had cooperated in the late 17th century. North Carolina militiamen served 
alongside those of Georgia and South Carolina, most likely attributed to a shared enemy, the Cherokee 
Indians. See Thomas G. Mitchell, Indian Fighters Turned Politicians: From Military Service to Public 
Office (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 3; Rene Chartrand, Monongahela 1754–55: Washington’s 
Defeat, Braddock’s Disaster (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 62–6. 
80 Stewart, American Military History, 41. 
81 Ibid., 42 
82 The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 3, 16 April 1756–9 November 1756, ed. W. 
W. Abbot (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 430–435. 
83 Chartrand, Monongahela 1754–55, 62–66. 
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The French and Indian War provided invaluable military experience, planted the 
seeds of cooperation between the colonial governors and their militias, and molded the 
character and leadership of George Washington, who eventually united the colonies 
during the Revolutionary War.84 Military knowledge gained proved invaluable, as “many 
colonials later to become famous in the Revolution had served their military 
apprenticeship as officers of middle rank.”85 In addition to George Washington, these 
men included Israel Putnam, Philip Schuyler, John Stark, Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, and 
Richard Montgomery. Most importantly, these colonial militia leaders had actually 
served in a military capacity prior to taking command.86 
As the French and Indian War came to an end, the British government began to 
feel the financial burden of the war and moved to force the colonials to contribute to 
imperial defense. Under the initiative to create an “American Establishment,” a large 
force of British regulars to be established for colonial defense, the British government 
began to impose a series of taxes without offering the colonials a voice in parliament to 
protest, hence, taxation without representation—a misjudgment that led to eventual 
insurrection of the colonies.87 
84 Stewart, American Military History, 30–33. 
85 Ibid., 41–42. 
86 Ibid., 30–46. 
87 Stewart, American Military History, 45–6; Mitchell, Indian Fighters, 1–3. 
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IV. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR MILITIA AND THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
To place any dependence upon militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken 
staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life—
unaccustomed to the din of arms—totally unacquainted with every kind of 
military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves 
when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, 
superior in knowledge, and superior in arms, makes them timid and ready 
to fly from their own shadows.88 
—George Washington 
During the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), the colonial militias 
continued to play a crucial role by providing local defense, responding to emergent needs 
of the revolution, and augmenting the Continental Army as they fought against the British 
regular army. Initially, the militia performed well against British regulars during the 
battles of Lexington and Concord, but history has concluded that the Americans won the 
war by creating and utilizing a regular army and establishing political ties with the 
French. Without the aid of the Continental Army and the French crown, American 
victory would have been impossible.89 
This chapter reviews the role of the militia during the Revolutionary War period 
to the Confederation period and continues to shed light on the development of the 
American militia. 
A. THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
As frustration mounted over what colonialists perceived as unjust taxation, 
colonial leaders attended the First Continental Congress in Philadelphia from September 
5 to October 26, 1775. Their intent was to draft official petitions, address the Intolerable 
Acts, and establish non-import/non-export agreements in order to place pressure the 
88 “Association of the Sons of Liberty in New York; December 15, 1773,” Yale Law School, accessed 
November 12, 2014, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/assoc_sons_ny_1773.asp. 
89 Robert K. Wright Jr., The Continental Army (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1983), 
4–20. Stewart, American Military History, 45–105. 
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British government to address colonial concerns with regard to colonial rule.90 Within 
The Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, the colonials addressed 
the philosophical nature of freedom and the right to representation within free 
governments: 
Resolved, 4. That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free 
government, is a right in the people to participate in their legislative 
council: and as the English colonists are not represented, and from their 
local and other circumstances, . . . we cheerfully consent to the operation 
of such acts of the British parliament, as are bonfide [sic], restrained to the 
regulation of our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the 
commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother country, and the 
commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea of 
taxation internal or external, for raising a revenue on the subjects, in 
America, without their consent.91 
The colonials still wished to reconcile with British Parliament and King George and 
hoped that a political resolution could be reached; however, in anticipation that 
parliament would ignore their requests, the colonists established committees in each 
colony and township that became local authorities in regard to imposing the agreements 
reached at the First Continental Congress. These committees soon gained control of the 
local militias and began to prepare them to oppose British regulars at a minute’s notice if 
required. 92 
The Massachusetts Provincial Congress immediately met to create a shadow 
government and designed “Executive Committees of Safety and of Supplies” and gave 
90 Parliament passed the Coercive Acts, or Intolerable Acts as they were known by the colonists, after 
the Boston Tea Party in order to quell the rebellious activities in Boston. The Acts included the Boston Port 
Act (which effectively closed the port of Boston), the Administration of Justice Act, the Massachusetts 
Government Act, the Quartering Act, and the Quebec Act. Samuel Adams spoke of these acts in a letter to 
James Warren in May of 1774, “This Town has received the Copy of an Act of the British Parliament, 
wherein it appears that we have been tried and condemned, and are to be punished, by the shutting up of the 
harbor and other marks of revenge, until we shall disgrace ourselves by servilely yielding up, in effect, the 
just and righteous claims of America. . . .The people receive this cruel edict with abhorrence and 
indignation.” From Harry Alonzo Cushing, The Writings of Samuel Adams Collected and Edited, vol. 3, 
1907. Reprint. (London: Forgotten Books, 2013), 112–3; Stewart, American Military History, 45–46. 
91 Charles C. Tansill, compiler, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American 
States (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1927), House Document No. 398, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp. 
92 Stewart, American Military History, 40–48. 
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these committees the power to form and call out the Massachusetts militia when 
needed.93 They called for “the militia officers to reorganize their commands into more 
efficient units, to conduct new elections, to drill according to the latest British manual, 
and to organize one-quarter of the colony’s force into ‘minute companies.’” 94 Of course, 
these militias, most notably the Minutemen, were the first to oppose British regulars in 
Lexington and Concord, and later they fought bravely during the Siege on Boston.95 
B. THE SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS AND THE CONTINENTAL 
ARMY 
In the summer of 1775, the colonies held the Second Continental Congress in 
order to properly coordinate the war effort and to begrudgingly establish a standing army 
in order to officially take up arms against the British.96 The following is an excerpt from 
the Second Continental Congress document Declaration on the Causes and Necessity of 
Taking up Arms: 
In our own native land, in defence [sic] of the freedom that is our birth-
right, and which we ever enjoyed till the late violation of it—for the 
protection of our property, acquired solely by the honest industry of our 
fore-fathers and ourselves, against violence actually offered, we have 
taken up arms. We shall lay them down when hostilities shall cease on the 
part of the aggressors, and all danger of their being renewed shall be 
removed, and not before.97 
The colonists’ decision to raise an army was inevitable, and the militia was the natural 
beginning to this endeavor. At first, the colonials thought that the best course of action 
was to strengthen the existing militias; however, as hostilities worsened, leadership 
realized that a force of militia alone might not suffice. According to Dr. Robert K. 
Wright, Jr. in his work The Continental Army: 
93 Wright Jr., The Continental Army, 11; Stewart, American Military History, 45–6 
94 Wright Jr., The Continental Army, 11. 
95 Wright Jr., The Continental Army, 1–20; Stewart, American Military History, 45–6. 
96 American Military History, 45–6. 
97 Tansill, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States. 
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American leaders moved beyond the basic militia. They began to prepare 
provisional militia units that could muster at short notice and remain in the 
field for longer periods. Whether volunteer companies or minutemen, 
these units were a response to the same need to minimize economic 
disruption that seventeenth century colonists had faced. The New England 
army that came into being at the instigation of Massachusetts moved a step 
beyond the minutemen.98 
Eventually this New England Army became the newly formed Continental Army.  
During the Second Continental Congress, the delegates chose George Washington as 
Commanding General.  Understandably, Washington sustained his views on the militia 
from the French and Indian War, and now he was paired again with militiamen, who by 
all standards were subpar with regard to military discipline. In a letter to his cousin Lund 
Washington in September 1776, Washington expresses his displeasure: 
I am wearied to death all day with a variety of perplexing circumstances—
disturbed at the conduct of the militia, whose behavior and want of 
discipline has done great injury to the other troops, who never had 
officers, except in a few instances, worth the bread they eat.99 
Whatever Washington’s views, the militia made up the bulk of the Continental Army in 
its inception; moreover, the New England Army had worked independently at the 
beginning of the Siege on Boston and had performed quite well against British regulars. 
Throughout the war, Washington continued to recruit from militia groups in order to 
maintain his numbers; even though the militia failed to dependably hold lines, they were 
still a valuable asset against the British regulars when utilized correctly.100 
John Adams, in a letter to James Warren in October 1775, praised the idea of a 
militia, and he idealistically implied that citizen soldiers in command of an army, with 
full understanding of the meaning of true liberty, would not use said army to destroy 
personal liberties: 
98 Wright, The Continental Army, 4–20. 
99 “Letter from George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30, 1776,” National Archives, 
accessed January 12, 2015. http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0341. 
100 Louis Gottschalk, LaFayette and the Close of the American Revolution, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1942),108-9; Wright, The Continental Army, 4–20; Stewart, American Military History, 45–
71. 
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The Militia is composed of free Citizens. There is therefore no Danger of 
their making Use of their Power to the Destruction of their own Rights or 
suffering others to invade them. I earnestly wish that young Gentlemen of 
a military Genius, and many such I am satisfied there are in our Colony, 
might be instructed in the Art of War, and taught at the same time the 
Principles of a free Government, and deeply impressd [sic] with a Sense of 
that indispensable Obligation which every Individual is under to the whole 
Society. These might in Time be fit for Officers in the Militia and being 
thoroughly acquainted with the Duties of Citizens as well as Soldiers 
might be entrusted with a Share in the Command of our Army, at such 
Times as Necessity might require so dangerous a Body to exist.101 
Although many in the militia were of the lower classes, they did not make up the majority 
of the militia. What’s more, because of the continual need for men, the Continental Army 
also accepted blacks, who at the time were considered the bottom of the ranks. James 
Mahon, in his work The History of the Militia and the National Guard, asserts: 
Low-status whites came in, but yeomen and artisans also entered the 
ranks. By and large, the enlisted men of the Revolutionary Army were not 
the castoffs and conscripts characteristic of European forces. What the 
Americans fielded was unique for the end of the eighteenth century it was 
a citizen army.102 
After years of conflict and several campaigns, the Continental Army and their 
French allies launched an offensive against British General Cornwallis at Yorktown. The 
Virginia Militia was present in small numbers. Michael McDonnell, University of 
Sydney, suggests that “even the best estimates of the number of militia at Yorktown show 
that perhaps no more than 3,000 participated in some way, whereas 7,800 French troops, 
and more than 5,000 Continental troops . . . . This, of a militia estimated to number more 
than 50,000.”103 The deciding factor at the battle of Yorktown was not the militia, but the 
French naval force commanded by Admiral Comte de Grasse who kept the British from 
101 John Adams, ,”“in Warren-Adams Letters: Being Chiefly a Correspondence among John Adams, 
Samuel Adams, and James Warren (1743–1814), vol. 2, ed. by Henry Cabot Lodge (Boston: Publisher, 
1917), 198. 
102 Mahon, John K. The History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: MacMillan, Inc., 
1983), accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.potowmack.org/mahonch3.html. 
103 Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class and Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 474. 
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being reinforced; moreover, his ships prevented any retreat of Cornwallis and his forces. 
Yorktown was the decisive battle that ended the revolutionary war and lead to the Treaty 
of Paris on September 3, 1783.104 
The strength of the militia alone was not enough to end the American 
Revolutionary War; the militias were not well suited to fight a lengthy war against a 
regular army. Those in the congress understood this eventuality, which led them to the 
formation of the Continental Army. According to Mahon: 
It is true that the militia played a very important role in the War of 
American Independence. Its political functions probably were 
indispensable, and as a military institution, supported by state troops, it 
continued to meets its traditional colonial responsibilities for local defense 
and for providing a general emergency reserve.105 
C. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
The delegates of the Second Continental Congress conceived the Articles of 
Confederation in 1776 in order to establish national government functions to better 
coordinate the war effort across the 13 colonies. Within a year, all the colonies had 
adopted the Articles, with the exception of Maryland, whose delegates signed the 
agreement in in March of 1781, only after raids by British soldiers along the Chesapeake 
stoked fear in the Marylanders. Now independent, the newly formed United States of 
America found itself entangled in a series of tenuous interstate trade and border disputes 
that threatened unity in the nation.106 
Shays’ Rebellion exposed the weaknesses inherent in the militia system and 
highlighted the state and federal governments’ inability to manage the debts incurred 
104 Stewart, American Military History, 98–102. 
105 Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard. 
106 Robert K. Wright and Morris J. MacGregor, “The Articles of Confederation,” Soldier-Statesmen of 
the Constitution, U.S. Army Center of Military History, U.S. Army, August 11, 2000, 
http://www.history.army.mil/books/RevWar/ss/ch3.htm; Stewart, American Military History, 107–113. 
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during the revolution.107 The weak federal government, created by design, held little 
power to force cooperation between the states, or even compel the states to pay taxes to 
run the national government. The nation was at a turning point, and again delegates called 
upon George Washington to unite the diverse states and bring order to the chaos. The 
failure of the confederation was evident, and the members of Congress met in May of 
1787 in Philadelphia to alter the Articles and somehow resolve the issues that plagued the 
states. In order to amend the Articles, all 13 colonies had to reach unanimity, a task most 
nearly impossible to complete; hence, the first recommendation proposed at the 
conference was the abolition of the Articles and the establishment of a new form of 
government, which later became the Constitution.108 
107 Stewart, American Military History, 113; Washington was not optimistic about resolving the 
governmental issues facing the Confederate Congress. In a written response to Henry Knox with regard to 
his hearing of Shays’ Rebellion, Washington expressed that “If government shrinks, or is unable to enforce 
its laws; fresh manœuvres [sic] will be displayed by the insurgents—anarchy & confusion must prevail—
and every thing [sic] will be turned topsy turvey [sic] in that State; where it is not probable the mischiefs 
will terminate.” –Letter to Henry Knox, February 3rd, 1787, quoted in “Rediscovering George 
Washington,” accessed November 22, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/georgewashington/collection/pre-
pres_1787feb3.html. 
108 Stewart, American Military History, 112–113. 
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V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
TO THE MODERN SDF 
An overweening vanity leads the fond many, each man against the 
conviction of his own heart, to believe or affect to believe, that militia can 
beat veteran troops in the open field and even play of battle. This idle 
notion, fed by vaunting demagogues, alarmed us for our country, when in 
the course of time and chance, which happen to all, she should be at war 
with a great power.109 
—Gouverneur Morris 
The failures associated with the Articles of Confederation tested the resolve of the 
founding fathers and set in motion a chain of events that helped define the role of the 
militia and the U.S. military. From the Constitution to the current laws of the individual 
states, the central concept of limiting the powers of the executive still permeates 
legislation. This chapter is designed to offer a legal review of established federal and 
state law with regard to the militia and will place the SDF within a sound legal 
framework in order to highlight the advantages of these volunteer organizations. 
Tennessee statutes will serve as the example for SDF state legal precedent. 
A. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE MILITIA 
Many of the delegates of the 1787 Constitutional Convention opposed a national 
army in the hands of a centralized government, which they feared would become a 
tyrannical tool used to oppress the people. Nonetheless, the states still faced issues such 
as civil unrest, Indian attacks on the frontier, and potential invasion from foreign powers, 
and as experienced in the recent revolution, the militia was not always a sufficient 
military force.110 With this in mind, the anti-Federalists and Federalists entered heated 
debates on how to maintain national security without a national army, or how to have 
such an army without infringing on liberty.111 
109 Max Farrand, ed. Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Volume 3 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1996), 420. 
110 Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution”; Stewart, American Military History, 112–113. 
111 Ibid. 
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Alexander Hamilton, an ardent Federalist, believed that under the Articles of 
Confederation the states were incapable of defending themselves collectively from 
enemies foreign or domestic, as demonstrated during the resent chaos of Shays’ 
Rebellion. Hamilton observed, “Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the 
aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.”112 Governor 
Edmund Randolph of Virginia agreed and concluded that “the Revolution had 
demonstrated conclusively that a regular army was needed to defend the nation without 
the economic disruption brought about by large-scale mobilization of the state 
militias.”113 On the contrary, anti-Federalists fearing despotism believed the national 
defense should solely remain with the militia. James Madison, although a Federalist, 
asserted that “[t]he means of defence [sic] against foreign danger, have been always the 
instruments of tyranny at home . . . . Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the 
pretext of defending, have enslaved the people”114 
Madison may have been referring to the reign of King James in 17th-century 
England, who used a standing army to coerce Britain to accept Catholicism, which in 
turn, threatened English liberty. In July 1687, King James II had increased the size of his 
standing army and used that power to prorogue parliament. He used his power, as well, to 
increase the Catholic influence in England, manipulate British laws, circumvent normal 
elections, and eventually dissolve Parliament in order to rule autonomously.115 After 
William of Orange removed James II from power in the Glorious Revolution of 
November 1688, Parliament established the English Bill of Rights in order to limit the 
power of future monarchs by vesting all legislative authority in the legislature.116 
112 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #15,” in The Federalist Papers, accessed 10 September 2014, 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed15.htm. 
113 Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution.” 
114 Max Farrand, ed. Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Volume 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1996), 465; Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution”; Stewart, American Military 
History, 112–113. 
115 Even though King James II unduly used his influence after his conversion to Catholicism, he did 
promote religious tolerance by issuing a declaration of Indulgence in 1687; “James II: 1685–1688.” 
116 “James II: 1685–1688”; “English Bill of Rights,” Yale Law School, accessed, January 6, 2015, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp. 
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After nearly a century of grueling religious and civil war, England’s Parliament 
also sought to limit the executive’s capacity for destruction and violence by outlawing a 
large standing army that was not raised with Parliament’s approval. The 1689 Bill of 
Rights states: 
And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, 
pursuant to their respective letters and elections, being now assembled in a 
full and free representative of this nation . . . [t]hat the raising or keeping a 
standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with 
consent of Parliament, is against law.117 
A century later, another civil war of sorts cost Britain its American colonies, but 
the new United States remained transfixed by the apparent conundrum of the army in a 
democracy. In the spirit of compromise, however, anti-Federalist and Federalist delegates 
eventually reached an agreement that limited the appropriations of said army to two 
years. If the people wished to reduce or dismiss the army due to apparent misuse, the 
members of the House of Representatives could simply oppose further appropriations, 
thereby cutting the army’s funding.118 The governmental branch closest to the people 
held the power to increase the army or decrease it as it saw fit; hence, just as parliament 
controlled the English military, so the representatives of Congress would control a U.S. 
military.119 
Within the Constitution, the delegates addressed the issue of an army in Article I, 
Section 8, clause 12 of the Constitution, also known as the army clause: “The Congress 
shall have Power . . . [t]o raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that 
use shall be for a longer term than two years.” Additionally, to accompany the army 
clause and keep the army under the control of the civilian authority, Article 1, Section 8, 
117 “English Bill of Rights.”  
118 “James II: 1685–1688.” 
119 U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12; “Army Clause,” The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, accessed 
March 20, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/52/army-clause; Wright and 
MacGregor, “The Constitution.” 
 35 
                                                 
clause 14 was drafted, which gives Congress absolute power to regulate the military.120 
To ensure the ability to thwart future insurrections such as the rebellion in Massachusetts 
the delegates gave Congress the power to “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute 
the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”121 
The delegates then turned their attention to the role of the militia. George Mason, 
an anti-Federalist and Virginia delegate, stressed that the militia should be standardized 
to allow for the smaller national army and that the federal government should regulate the 
organization, the armaments, and the tactics of the militia. Massachusetts delegate 
Elbridge Gerry and Luther Martin of Maryland opposed any type of standing army and 
therefore opposed any central control of the militia. Meanwhile, others debated various 
approaches to the militia being balanced between federal and state control. George 
Washington, Henry Knox, and Baron von Steuben proposed the creation of a “national, 
select militia force,” which was met with two rebuttals: one that it would lead to the 
“erosion of the common militia” and two, a militia with federal responsibilities would 
diminish its service to the state.122 
Eventually, the delegates decided to give the national government the legislative 
“power . . . [t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for 
governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States”; 
meanwhile, the power to train the militia and appoint officers remained with the states, as 
long as training was performed “according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”123 
Senior officers could only be appointed with senatorial concurrence. 
120 Article 1, Section 8, clause 13, the Navy clause, was not subject to the same level of debate since 
mercantilism was prevalent in the Americas and the need for a national navy was somewhat obvious. Anti-
Federalists were concerned that a strong navy may instigate war with other naval powers; nonetheless, the 
delegates gave Congress the power to “provide and maintain a Navy”; U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 13; 
“Navy Clause,” The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, accessed March 20, 2015, 
http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/53/navy-clause. 
121 Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution.” 
122 Ibid. 
123 U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 16. “Organizing the Militia,” The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, 
accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/56/organizing-the-
militia. 
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An additional stipulation was placed on the militia, the army, and the navy in 
Article 2, section 2, which states: “The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States when called 
into the actual Service of the United States.”124 These checks and balances within the 
Constitution—composed with purposefully blurred lines of exact authority so that every 
decision to raise an army and go to war necessitated debate and discussion—assuaged 
fears of the menacing permanent army. Further, the Constitution ensured civilian control 
of the military by having funding regulated by the House of Representatives, the 
appointment of senior officers managed by the Senate, and the military directed by its 
commander in chief, the president of the United States.125 
B. THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
The Second Amendment of the Constitution states: “A well-regulated militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear 
arms, shall not be infringed.”126 David E. Vandercoy, in his work “The History of the 
Second Amendment,” contends that the “national, select militia force” suggested by 
Washington, Knox, and Steuben during the Constitutional Convention instilled fear that 
such a force “armed by and loyal to the federal government, would be accompanied by 
disarmament of the people in general.”127 
Nonetheless, the stress is on the assertion that “the well-regulated militia” is 
“necessary to the security of a free state,”128 which could be interpreted as a reference to 
124 Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution.” 
125 U.S. Const., art. II, sec. 2; Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution.” 
126 David E. Vandercoy, “The History of the Second Amendment,” Valparaiso University Law Review 
28 (1994): 1007–39. 
127 Although this thesis is not centered on the legal debate on whether the right to bear arms is an 
individual right or simply the right of those who are part of the state’s militia, in light of the constitutional 
delegates’ views on standing armies, research suggests “the right to bear arms” is an individual right. 
Vandercoy agrees. He suggests that “the original intent of the Second Amendment was to protect each 
individual’s right to keep and bear arms, and to guarantee that individuals acting collectively could throw 
off the yokes of any oppressive government which might arise”; Vandercoy, “The History of the Second 
Amendment,” 2. 
128 Vandercoy, “The History of the Second Amendment,” 1–3. 
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Congress’s power to regulate the militia in Article I, section 8, clause 16: “The Congress 
shall have Power [t]o . . . provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, 
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States.”129 Also, the last part of the militia clause leaves to the states the responsibility 
for the “[a]ppointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according 
to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”130 Therefore, if states choose officers from 
within their own populations and those officers lead an armed militia of citizens from that 
same state, they presumably will oppose any despotic ruler and therefore remain free. 
Noah Webster, a contemporary of the founding fathers, suggests:131 
Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are 
in almost every Kingdom of Europe. The Supreme power in America 
cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the 
people are armed, and constitute a force superior to any bands of regular 
troops that can be, on any pretense, raised in the United States.132 
C. THE MILITIA ACTS OF 1792 
The reality of militia forces did not immediately live up to these expectations. 
Two years after the Constitution was ratified, British agents from Canada violated the 
1783 Treaty of Paris by prompting American Indians to attack U.S. settlers in the North 
West Territory. President Washington dispatched American troops commanded by 
Brigadier General Josiah Harmar in an attempt to suppress the Indian raids. The attempt 
was futile. Little Turtle, the Miami chief, quickly overwhelmed Hamar’s force, which 
was inadequately supplied and poorly commanded. Washington’s second attempt to quell 
the Indian riots was even more disastrous, for he sent disease-weakened Major General 
St. Clair and a force of 1,400 men, mostly comprised of volunteer militia. Little Turtle’s 
129 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 16.  
130 Ibid. 
131 Wright and MacGregor, “The Constitution.” 
132 Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution Proposed 
by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia (Philadelphia: Prichard & Hall, 1787), reprinted in Paul L. 
Ford, ed., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States Published during its Discussion by the 
People: 1787–1788 (Philadelphia: Prichard & Hall, 1888). 
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forces devastated St. Clair’s troops. Those men who were not killed in battle were 
brutally tortured.133  
President Washington’s reaction to the defeat was the establishment of the First 
Militia Acts of 1972, which authorized the president to assemble militias of several states 
in times of foreign or Indian invasion; hence, the president now possessed the power to 
federalize the militia “whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the 
execution thereof obstructed.”134 Additionally, the law granted states the right to 
organize a militia and compel citizens to serve. The act states: 
That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective 
States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and 
under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall 
severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia.135 
The system put in place by the Militia Acts, added little value to the U.S. Army, 
for there was no federal funding for equipment or pay, and “there were no sanctions for 
non-compliance.”136 Although flawed in concept, the acts were the first congressional 
endeavor “to provide a credible force to augment the Regular Army during wartime 
without bankrupting the country or resorting to a militarization of American society.”137 
D. THE DICK ACT 
In 1901, the U.S. secretary of war, Elihu Root, introduced Congress to a program 
that called for the reorganization of the U.S. militia and other volunteer groups due to the 
insufficient size of the federal forces during the recent Spanish-American War. 
Consequently, the Militia Act of 1792 was replaced by the Dick Act of 1903, which 
established a clear differentiation between the organized militia, now termed the National 
133 Patrick Feng, “The Battle of the Wabash: The Forgotten Disaster of the Indian Wars,” National 
Museum of the United States Army, accessed October 3, 2014, https://armyhistory.org/the-battle-of-the-
wabash-the-forgotten-disaster-of-the-indian-wars/. 
134 Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 1, 1 Stat. at 264. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Barry M. Stentiford. The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century, 
Williams-Ford Texas A&M University Military History Series (Location: Texas A&M University Press, 
2002), Kindle edition. 
137 Stentiford, The American Home Guard. 
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Guard, and the Reserve Militia. Guard units were to be reorganized to match the structure 
of the regular army. Short annual training sessions, as well as drills, became mandatory; 
moreover, federal funds became available for the National Guard forces. In 1908, the 
Medical Reserve Corps was instituted and served as a precursor of the future U.S. Army 
Reserve that “in the future would train, commission, mobilize, and retain hundreds of 
thousands of officers.”138 
In 1910, a plan for three permanent infantry divisions was drafted to aid the 
Regular Army as well the National Guard; however, it was never carried out due to the 
conflict along the Mexican border in 1911. As a result, the Army established and 
implemented a provisional maneuver division of about 13,000 officers to end border 
skirmishes in San Antonio, Texas. This attempt was a complete failure because of the 
Army’s inability to deploy in an efficient manner. Barry Stentiford, in his work The 
American Home Guard, aptly describes the transition from the Organized Militia to the 
National Guard. He states that, “In retrospect, the Spanish-American War represented the 
swan song of the old system, and the Great War marked the dawn of the modern 
American military establishment.”139 
E. WWI TO THE PRESENT 
Despite the effectiveness of the Dick Act, WWI presented state governors with 
unforeseen challenges when all the members of the NG forces were deployed, depriving 
the states of military defensive capability to repulse U.S. mainland attacks; therefore, 
governors began to create “home defense forces or organized state militias.”140 
Consequently, Congress passed the Home Defense Act of 1917, which granted states the 
right to organize home defense forces when the National Guard is mobilized. After WWI, 
the majority of the SDF units were disbanded until WWII, when the reinstatement of the 
SDF attracted over 150,000 members across 46 states. Again the war diminished and 
state forces decreased. As the Cold War began, the need for homeland defense rose yet 
138 Ibid. 
139 Stentiford, The American Home Guard. 
140 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia.” 
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again, leading Congress to amend the National Defense Act, which continues to be the 
legal foundation for these volunteer organizations.141 
F. TITLE 32 U.S. CODE § 109 AND TENNESSEE SDF LEGISLATION 
Federal law Title 32 U.S. Code § 109 allows for Tennessee, along with the other 
states and U.S. territories, to promulgate legislation to “organize and maintain defense 
forces.”142 This force may be utilized by the chief executive, the governor, within the 
jurisdiction of his or her respective state; moreover, these forces are in addition to the 
state’s National Guard.143 
Tennessee has established such a force, and per the Tennessee Constitution, 
Article III, Section 5, the governor has been appointed “commander-in-chief of the Army 
and Navy . . . and of the Militia, except when they shall be called into the service of the 
United States”; however, his power to call forth the militia is limited by two restrictions: 
one, the “Militia shall not be called into service except in case of rebellion or invasion” 
and two, the governor requires concurrence of the Tennessee General Assembly, which 
“shall declare, by law, that the public safety requires it.”144 
In parallel with Article 1, section 8, clause 16 of the U.S. Constitution, Tennessee 
Code 58-1-405 states that: 
The governor is authorized to appoint and commission necessary officers 
for the state guard; to prescribe rules and regulations governing the 
enlistment, organization, administration, pay, equipment, discipline and 
discharge of the personnel of the state guard.145 
In addition to regulating the Tennessee State Guard (TSG), the governor, per 
Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) 58-1-405, may also “obtain by grant, requisition, or 
purchase such necessary arms and equipment as may be secured from the department of 
141 Stentiford, The American Home Guard. 
142 Maintenance of Other Troops, Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (1958). 
143 Ibid. 
144 TN Constitution, art III, sec 5.  
145 TCA 58–1-405. 
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defense . . . [for] the necessary arms and equipment to maintain and equip the state 
guard”146; therefore, when required, the TSG can be armed “in case of rebellion or 
invasion” in the State of Tennessee. Additionally, per TCA 58-1-401 and 410, if the 
Tennessee National Guard is called into national service per U.S.C. Title 10, the governor 
can call forth the Tennessee Guard.147 
The U.S. Constitution, federal laws, and Tennessee legislation sanction the use of 
the TSG by the Tennessee state governor. As the Dick Act was the genesis of today’s 
National Guard, so Title 32 U.S.C. 109 is the new legacy for the organized militia when 
the National Guard is federalized or deployed.148 
 
146 Ibid.  
147 Tennessee Code 58–1-401, 410. 
148 Maintenance of Other Troops, Title 32 U.S.C. § 109 (1958). 
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VI. STATE DEFENSE FORCES AND HURRICANE KATRINA  
Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent sustained flooding of New Orleans 
exposed significant flaws in our national preparedness for catastrophic 
events and our capacity to respond to them. Emergency plans at all levels 
of government – including the 600-page National Response Plan that set 
forth the Federal government’s plan to coordinate all its departments and 
agencies and integrate them with State, local, and private sector partners – 
were put to the test and came up short.149 
—The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
 
Hurricane Katrina, with its devastating 127 mph winds and unprecedented 27-foot 
storm surge, remains the costliest residential disaster in the history of the United 
States.150 This massive storm spanned over 93,000 miles and spread destruction over 
most of the northern Gulf Coast from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Mobile, Alabama.151 
1,330 people lost their lives as a result of the storm, and property damage estimates 
climbed to 108 billion dollars; thousands were left without shelter, power, clean water, 
sanitation, and food, while emergency responders were rendered ineffectual by the sheer 
scope of such widespread destruction. This disaster exposed weaknesses in the nation’s 
Emergency Response Plan, and the residents of the Gulf coast suffered the 
consequences.152 
Although Katrina itself had dissipated within 48 hours of landfall, the weeks 
following amplified the complexity of the situation and tested the mettle of federal, state 
149 Frances Fragos et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, 2006, 1–2. 
150 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, January 2008, 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. According to the National Response Framework, “A 
catastrophic incident is defined as any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, 
infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions”; “The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.” 
151 “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Table of Events,” National Climate Data Center: 
NOAA, accessed October 15, 2014, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events. 
152 Ibid. 
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and local emergency responders.153 Emergency management protocols were found to be 
insufficient, and soon government officials faced a wicked problem.154 Coordination 
seemed impossible on such a large scale, especially in the city of New Orleans where 
those in charge of relief efforts faced communication difficulties and personality 
conflicts. State and local leaders clashed on how and when to execute evacuations, and 
law enforcement officials became victims themselves as they fled the wrath of Katrina. 
As the storm passed, the media concentrated on heroic acts by the Coast Guard, National 
Guard, and other emergency responders, but soon their praise turned to criticism. 
Networks, eager for ratings, captured the public eye by citing government oversight 
failures and broadcasting images of starving Americans stranded on interstate overpasses 
to prove their point. Stories of rape and pillaging in New Orleans topped the headlines, 
and the major news networks flooded the airways with discrediting comments from local 
residents.  
Answering the public outcry, former President George W. Bush confirmed the 
breakdown in government oversight during a joint news conference on September 13th, 
15 days after the storm: “Katrina exposed serious problems in our response capability at 
all levels of government, and to the extent that the federal government didn’t fully do its 
job right, I take responsibility.”155  
Despite the apparent failures, there are success stories with regard to many of the 
first responders, including “government, private sector, faith-based, non-profit, and other 
volunteer personnel who collaborated in innovative ways to provide medical, financial, 
and housing assistance.”156 State Defense Forces were part of this collaborative effort. 
153 Fragos et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 1–19. 
154 A wicked problem presents decision makers with a complex scenario with no finite solution. It 
does not have a definable problem statement or definitive stopping point; moreover, it cannot be 
objectively evaluated as right or wrong. Decision makers can only hope to find a “good enough” solution; 
see Horst W. J. Rittel, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 155–69. 
155 “Bush to Address Nation Thursday about Katrina,” CNN.com, September 13, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/13/katrina.washington/. 
156 Fragos et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina,48. 
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James J. Carafano, Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security, 
suggests, 
As the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, these 
groups can be an important supplement to the National Guard, particularly 
during catastrophic disasters. When trained, disciplined, and well 
organized, local responders are essential for providing immediate aid and 
security. Congress and the Bush Administration should encourage states to 
better organize, train, and equip these volunteer units.157 
This chapter considers the following questions: How did the Gulf States utilize 
SDFs during Katrina? Are the states too dependent on the federal government for 
emergency management? Moreover, how can states better utilize SDFs in the future to 
enhance the state’s emergency response and reduce federal dependency? 
A. SDFS AND THEIR ROLE IN HURRICANE KATRINA 
An estimated 2,274 SDF members from eight different states responded to the 
Katrina disaster and participated as emergency response personnel.158 SDF members 
from Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Texas, Maryland, Virginia, California and 
Tennessee, at the request of their respective adjutant general, were activated and utilized 
in various capacities: primarily, for augmenting National Guard Units, and secondarily, 
for those members with medical backgrounds, to provide emergent medical care to the 
thousands injured or displaced by the storm.  
The Maryland Defense Force (MDDF) incorporated physicians as military 
medical personnel and successfully deployed an 81-person team to Louisiana to “provide 
assistance in emergency management, health and mental hygiene, and homeland 
157 Carafano and Brinkerhof, “Katrina’s Forgotten Responders.” 
158 2,274 is an estimate based on SDF deployed during Hurricane Katrina and also Hurricane Rita, 
which occurred less than a month later Many of these SDF members volunteered to serve during both relief 
efforts “Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Director, National Guard Bureau stated that early numbers 
indicated that nearly 1,700 SDF personnel were assisting on Katrina needs and pledged to build stronger 
relationships with responders”; Colonel Martin Hershkowitz , “Summary of Available State Defense Force 
After Action Reports from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Deployments,” State Defense Force Journal Vol. 2, 
No. 1 (2006): 1. 
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security.”159 The California State Military Reserve (CASMR) also provided medical 
services with initial trauma care, internal medicine, and food distribution assistance.160 
Figure 2 depicts the number of SDF members deployed during Hurricane Katarina and 
Hurricane Rita and summarizes their accomplishments: 
 
 
Figure 2.  SDF Deployment Numbers for Hurricane Katrina161 
159 Carafano and Brinkerhof, “Katrina’s Forgotten Responders.”  
160 Ibid. 
161 Graphic was created by the author. All data derived from Hershkowitz, “Summary of Available 
State Defense Force After Action Reports from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Deployments,”; Information 
on CAMR from Carafano and Brinkerhof, “Katrina’s Forgotten Responders.” 
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B. U.S. MILITARY, NATIONAL GUARD, AND SDF RESPONSE 
Active duty military personnel led by Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, and 
National Guard Forces and SDFs led by their respective state governors, proved an 
integral asset in emergency relief efforts during and after Katrina. LTG Honoré, 
Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, in cooperation with other DOD assets served an 
integral role in “search and rescue, security, and logistical support” after Katrina’s 
landfall.162 In addition to manpower, the federal military forces provided two C-130 
firefighting aircraft, and seven helicopters were deployed to the area to perform “search 
and rescue, evacuation, and supply delivery missions.” Moreover, DOD aircraft were 
involved in malaria and other disease preventative measures by spraying over two million 
acres of land with the potential of developing high concentrations of mosquitos.163 
The National Guard’s response was only moderately effective due to its inability 
to cover the entirety of the disaster relief area. As a result, Lieutenant General H. Steven 
Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, urged all 54 TAGs to provide extra NG 
forces and equipment to the disaster relief zones. The Mississippi, Texas, and 
Pennsylvania National Guard troops were among the first responders to engage in a wide 
range of activities such as “enforcement support, debris removal, shelter support, 
evacuations, food and water distributions, communication restorations” to support the 
states in a dire need of attention.164 By the end of the Katrina disaster, around 50,000 
National Guard members from all 50 states were involved in disaster relief efforts.165 
More than 1,400 SDF members contributed to disaster relief during the aftermath 
of the storm. For example, the Texas State Guard paid over 1,000 members and placed 
them on active duty. Members were assigned to 12-hour shifts to assist in shelter 
management, where they provided immediate emergency medical aid to refugees with 
life-threatening injuries, supplied refugees with water supply, and performed support for 
162 Fragos et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 43. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., 42–44. 
165 Ibid. 
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the Red Cross to ensure the availability of health and safety services.166 The states of 
Georgia, Virginia, and Tennessee activated SDF support personnel in unpaid status to aid 
shelters as well as provide medical and administrative support. Additionally, Tennessee 
SDF members aided in transportation and facilitated housing at military installations for 
displaced disaster victims.167  
C. FUNDING KATRINA DISASTER RELIEF 
The federal government spent an estimated $120 billion along the Gulf Coast after 
Hurricane Katrina, and over $75 billion of that amount funded disaster relief 
operations.168 These figures are astronomical, but considering the scope of the damage, it 
is no wonder why the states had required aid from the federal government; however, did 
the states do their part before throwing in the proverbial towel? Since Katrina, 
administrations have continued to face major budget deficiencies, and in an effort to 
reduce spending and increase revenue, they have initiated over “$290 billion in cuts to 
public services and $100 billion in tax and fee increases.”169 States continue to tread 
water and depend on the federal government to subsidies their budgets. According to the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “The measures that states used to close their 
budget gaps, combined with the severity of the fiscal crisis that states faced, suggest that 
state services will remain at risk for a number of years.” 170 How can a state government 
be expected to have the funds to handle disaster management when it cannot support 
normal governmental services? It is no wonder that Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco 
requested then-President George Bush to declare an emergency prior to Katrina’s 
landfall. 
166 Carafano and Brinkerhof, “Katrina’s Forgotten Responders.” 
167 Ibid. 
168 “Hurricane Katrina Statistics Fast Facts,” CNN.com, August 22, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/. 
169 McNichol, Out of Balance, 1. 
170 Ibid. 
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Generally, only after state and local government resources are exhausted, or 
deemed insufficient, can a governor request aid from the federal government. Hopefully, 
the state is resourceful enough that the governor can activate the state National Guard and 
other emergency responders who can manage the incident. If not, the president of the 
United States, at the governor’s request, can then utilize the Stafford Act to declare a 
major disaster, which in turn allows for a “continuing means of assistance by the Federal 
Government to state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to 
alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters.”171 After a 
declaration of an “emergency” or “major disaster,” the state requests assistance and the 
federal government tasks its departments to fulfill those requests, thereby “pulling” the 
assistance required from pre-staged federal resource holding areas.172 Assets or 
commodities are often delivered to state officials and directly to local governments and 
those who are in need. Unfortunately, there are scenarios where the “state and local 
governments and responders may become victims themselves, prohibiting their ability to 
identify, request, receive, or deliver assistance. This is the moment of catastrophic 
crisis.”173 The federal government now has no choice but to step in and restore social 
order.174  
A governor with a properly trained and supported SDF, with members located in 
all areas of the state, could respond more quickly than that of the National Guard. These 
SDF members could be arranged like local volunteer firemen, who respond to the 
emergent needs of the state in their local communities at the sound of a siren; yes, a siren, 
in the same fashion as Paul Revere’s ride, an alarm to warn the local citizens of 
impending danger. These SDFs, working in conjunction with the National Guard and 
state and local law enforcement, may keep state government officials from having to call 
171 Robert T. Stafford, Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. 
172 “Emergency assistance is limited in scope and may not exceed $5 million without Presidential 
approval and notification to Congress. In contrast, for a major disaster, the full complement of Stafford Act 
programs can be authorized, including long term public infrastructure recovery assistance and consequence 
management”; Townsend et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 18. 
173 Fragos et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, 18. 
174 Ibid. 
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in the federal government during manageable emergencies, or at least ease the stress of 
federal responders by providing the greatest amount of resources to the disaster relief 
effort.  
Today, the Gulf States affected by Katrina are still in fiscal crisis. Lawmakers in 
Louisiana are struggling to handle a “tattered budget that begins with a $1.6 billion 
deficit.”175 Governor Bobby Jindal cut “more than 30,000 full-time state employees. 
Moreover, he has “privatized much of the Medicaid program, turned over the state’s 
charity hospitals to outside managers and looked for ways to make state government 
more efficient.”176 The Mississippi state budget is in terrible need of reform—more than 
half of its revenue is gleaned from the federal government. Additionally, it exceeded the 
“50 percent mark in both 2007 and 2010.”177  
Alabama is also in dire straits and is looking at a budget deficit of 700 million 
dollars in FY2015.178 Alabama Robert Bentley Governor Bentley spoke of the budget 
crisis in his most recent State of the State Speech: 
We have a $264-Million dollar combined shortfall in our General Fund 
and Education Budgets. . . . Because of our debt, and because there is no 
growth money going into our General Fund, we cannot adequately pay for 
and provide the basic essential services to our people. One thing I have 
always known about our people, and it has proven true during my time in 
office—they do not back down from a challenge. Not when they are 
175 Greg Hilburn, “Budget Dominates, but Eyes on Common Core, Processing Tax,” DailyWorld.com, 
March 7, 2015, http://www.dailyworld.com/story/news/local/2015/03/07/budget-dominates-eyes-common-
core-processing-tax/24574463/. 
176 ”How Bobby Jindal is Leaving a Budget Mess for Louisiana’s Next Governor: News Analysis,” 
Nola.com, February 12, 2015, 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/02/how_bobby_jindal_is_leaving_a.html. 
177 Bob Williams and Joe Luppino-Esposito, “Increased Federal Aid to States is a Long Term Trend,” 
State Budget Solutions.org, March 10, 2014, 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/increased-federal-aid-to-states-is-a-long-term-
trend. 
178 Kyle Whitmire, “So Now You Tell Us? After Reelection Bentley Comes Clean About Alabama 
Budget Crisis,” AL.com, November 26, 2014, 
http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/11/so_now_you_tell_us_after_reele.html. 
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fighting for their basic civil rights, not in defending our nation’s Freedoms 
and not in the aftermath of Natural Disasters.179 
As governors like Bentley look for alternatives in order to become more 
“effective, efficient, and accountable,” perhaps increasing his support of the SDF would 
be prudent.  
As fiscal considerations take their toll, many have suggested that SDFs be utilized 
in multiple capacities to ease fiscal demands on the state for emergency response. Dr. 
Kent Seig recommends that SDF members can fill numerous roles: “Individual members 
of these guards can be trained to provide for physical security, crowd control, and 
medical and logistical support to reserve and regular forces as well as to local and state 
authorities.”180 Even more, because the SDFs cannot be activated under Title 10 and 
therefore not subject to the limitations of Posse Comitatus, the governor can utilize them 
where he or she deems appropriate, an especially important point if the state’s National 
Guard has been federalized; so, in this scenario, the governor’s use of the SDF “would 
not interfere with federal or National Guard missions but would instead complement 
them.”181 Additionally, the National Guard may be deployed elsewhere or may have 
difficulty handling major catastrophes such as a chemical, nuclear, or biological attack, 
especially in remote areas. Regional response systems should be in place with local 
experts who can be at the center of the emergency management process. Because local 
response is at the heart of emergency management, state militias, according to Carafano, 
are perfect first responders because they “are continually stationed within their respective 
states and can be called up quickly and easily in times of need.”182  
179 Marl Almond, “Read Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley’s 2015 State of the State Speech,” AL.com, 
March 3, 2015, http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/03/read_alabama_gov_robert_bentle.html. 
180 Kent G. Sieg, “America’s State Defense Forces: An Historical Component of National Defense,” 
State Defense Force Publication Center, State Defense Force Journal 1 (Fall 2005): 3–7, 
http://www.sdfpubcntr.net/introduction.htm. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia.” 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
SDFs are trained, locally infused, organized state militias that stand ready to fill 
the gap in emergent circumstances, whether as law enforcement support, National Guard 
augmentation, or as immediate emergency responders. Scholars suggest that more states 
should use these SDFs more extensively to aid counterterrorism efforts and local natural 
or man-made disaster response, especially because federal aid can take up to 72 hours to 
reach a disaster area.183 Thirty-one states and U.S. territories do not have established 
SDFs, and as states debate the usefulness of these volunteer organizations, they may wish 
to consider the following findings from this thesis: 
• SDF as well as National Guard units are both considered part of a state’s 
organized militia. SDF members and the NG forces work together in 
conjunction during disaster relief operations or any other mission when 
directed Adjutant General. 
• SDFs, working in conjunction with and the National Guard state and local 
law enforcement, may keep the state and local governments from having 
to call in the federal government during manageable emergencies, or at 
least ease the stress of federal responders by provided the greatest amount 
of resources to the disaster. 
• SDFs, unlike National Guard units, cannot be federalized, which means 
they remain a state-level asset during emergency management operations. 
• SDFs are legitimate organized militias that are established through state 
legislation and serve at the request of the governor and the adjutant 
General within their respective state during emergent situations requiring 
military response. Legal precedent diminished the Patriot Militia’s 
existence. These types of militias. These militias should not be confused 
with modern SDFs. 
• SDF members have professional backgrounds, and many within these 
forces “contain a significant number of former and retired members of the 
armed forces, as well as accredited and state-licensed medical, legal, and 
other technical professionals.”184 
183 Rhodes and Carafano, “State and Regional Response to Disasters.” 
184 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense 
Force. 
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• The National Guard’s response to Hurricane Katrina was only moderately 
effective due to its inability to cover the entirety of the disaster relief area. 
SDFs can fill the GAP during catastrophic disasters. 
• As fiscal considerations take their toll on states, many have suggested that 
SDFs be utilized in multiple capacities to ease fiscal demands on the state 
for emergency response. 
• SDFs are free from the confines of the “Posse Comitatus Act, which 
prohibits federal military forces from engaging in domestic law 
enforcement activities within the United States.”185  
• SDFs provide a legitimate militia for state citizens who wish to volunteer 
for military public service. These forces may provide a positive outlet for 
those who might be tempted or coaxed to join Patriot Militias.  
• Regulations and federal laws were misconstrued by state organizations, 
minimizing the effectiveness of joint SDF and NG operations.  
• National Guard policy regarding SDF utilization was extremely limited, 
resulting in misunderstandings during mission planning due to the lack of 
SDF’s proper guidance. 
State Defense Forces appear to be an asset available to financially challenged 
states, providing emergency management personnel who can “provide critical manpower 
at minimal cost.”186 With recent cuts in the U.S. military and the National Guard, states 
may begin to see deficiencies in their emergency response framework. With this in mind, 
states may turn to SDFs to volunteer in greater numbers, rather than repeatedly relying on 
the federal government when they are confronted with natural and man-made 
disasters.187  
Additionally, as U.S. citizens bear the financial burden of the nation, Patriot 
Militias may gain momentum. A properly trained SDF, under the legitimate authority of 
the state, can provide a positive outlet for militia membership, thereby steering citizens 
away from radical militia groups.  
185 Department of Defense, Evaluation of Department of Defense Interaction with State Defense 
Force. 
186 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia.”  
187 Ibid. 
 54 
                                                 
With the continued threat of terrorism and the inevitability of natural disasters, 
states need to be prepared for crisis scenarios. What’s more, the United States has yet to 
face multiple major disasters simultaneously. Imagine disaster response for another 
category five hurricane in the gulf, a California earthquake, and a large-scale terrorist 
attack occurring simultaneously, especially with the present condition of the U.S. 
economy and the reductions in NG and military personnel.188 Local response will be 
critical in order to facilitate disaster recovery if the federal government becomes task 
saturated.  
The establishment of SDFs may be the next step for state officials to follow in the 
evolution of disaster response. Although SDFs are not a panacea, they may prove to be 
the element that allows state officials to maintain social control during disasters, and 
thereby improve the resiliency of the United States with regard to disaster response. 
188 “NGAUS, AUSA Join Forces Against Budget Cuts,” NGAUS.org, accessed January 27, 2015, 
http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/news/ngaus-ausa-join-forces-against-budget-cuts. 
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APPENDIX 
The militia movement in the United States draws together hundreds of 
diverse groups seeking to preserve their vision of an American society 
based on traditional ideals and, especially, on limited government. The 
movement’s self-image stems from the mythic understanding of the role of 
the American militias in the Revolutionary War.189 
—Richard S. Levy 
A. PATRIOT MILITIA ETHOS AND U.S. MILITIA HISTORY 
American anti-government militia groups, also known as Patriot Militias, point to 
militia history and the U.S. Constitution in order to justify their existence and propagate 
distrust of the current federal government within the American populace.190 Although the 
militia had minor successes throughout American history, the actual history tells a more 
nuanced tale.  
The militia system essentially failed during the Revolutionary War, the War of 
1812, and the Mexican American War, until it was finally transformed into the National 
Guard through the Dick Act of 1903. Still, the idea of the patriotic citizen soldier 
defending America from the tyranny of despotic rulers still pervades the Patriot Militia’s 
ethos.191 John Molloy suggests in his work, American Extremism, that anti-government 
militias often use “historical facts, myth, folklore” combined in an amalgam of 
propaganda in an attempt to “utilize American history for their own ends.”192  
This chapter explores the flaws inherent in the Patriot Militia’s use of American 
history by revisiting failures of the Confederation period, and revealing that a weak 
federal Government in a republican democracy will more likely lead to anarchy than a 
189 Richard S. Levy, ed., Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution, Vol. 
1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 465. 
190 “Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in the United States in 2011.”  
191 Ibid. 
192 Darren Mulloy, American Extremism: History, Politics and the Militia Movement (London: 
Routledge, 2004), 87; Stewart, American Military History, 379; Stentiford, The American Home Guard; 
Stewart, American Military History, 53–72. 
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utopia of personal freedom. Additionally, Patriot Militias will be compared to SDFs in 
order to contrast the two organizations.  
B. WEAKNESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 
The weak federal government during the Confederation period, a desired outcome 
of the Articles of Confederation, offered the states little national protection from internal 
rioting and interstate border disputes. Contrary to the myth-making of Patriot Militia 
leaders, the United States during the Confederation period bordered on anarchy. The 
lessons learned from Shay’s Rebellion proved that a weak central government had little 
power to bring unity to the states. Delegates watched as Massachusetts saw its 
government and judiciary buildings burnt and its justices tarred and feathered. The 
rebellion spread through bordering states, as Congress lacked the power to provide 
coercive leadership and remedy the problem. As chaos ensued, British onlookers believed 
the newly formed United States would eventually fail. And at the nadir of this period, the 
head of Congress eventually asked the Prince of Prussia to become King of the Americas, 
which he kindly refused.193  
These events eroded the foundations and the just causes of the Revolution, a 
period Patriot Militias are eager to reminisce. However, the Patriot groups fail to consider 
that if states have too much authority and are not under the coercive power of a federal 
government, the outcome can be an impotent national government ultimately rendered 
useless as it attempts to operate in a relatively anarchic system. 
C. THE CONFEDERATION, ANARCHY, AND OFFENSIVE REALISM 
The Confederation period may have paralleled the anarchic system as it applies to 
structural realism within international relations theory; e.g., no overarching authority had 
coercive power to decide disputes between nation states. Structural realism, more 
specifically offensive realism, may apply during the Confederation period if one 
193 Richard Krauel, “Prince Henry of Prussia and The Regency of the United States, 1786,” The 
American Historical Review 17, no. 1 (1911): 44–51; Stewart, American Military History, 53–72. 
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considers the individual states and sovereign entities to have no real allegiance or 
compulsory subordination to the central government.194  
Offensive realism is based on the following tenets: The international system is 
anarchic, so there is an “absence of a central authority that sits above [nation] states and 
can protect them from one another;” all nation states in the international system “always 
have some offensive military capability;” and all “states can never be certain about 
another states intentions.” 195 Based on these assumptions, the only way for a state to 
ensure security is through achieving primacy through the “unrelenting pursuit of 
power.”196  
These types of power struggles were evident during the Confederation period, 
especially because the early United States resembled more a group of independent 
sovereign nations under the humanitarian ministrations of the United Nations. The UN, 
although not a world government, attempts to promote cooperation between the nations, 
but is limited in its power to truly affect positive change within sovereign nations. 
According to their website, the UN has four purposes: “to maintain international peace 
and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in resolving 
international problems and in promoting respect for human rights; and to be a center for 
harmonizing the actions of nations.”197 These purposes appear to be similar to that of 
Article III within the Articles of Confederation:  
194 James Madison spoke of his disdain with regard to Congress’ inability to govern the states: “The 
effect of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only displayed the inefficiency of the authority making 
them, none of the states having duly complied with them, some having failed all together, or nearly so”; 
James Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 64; 
Stewart, American Military History, 53–72. 
195 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 43; 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison–Wesley, 1978). Dr. John 
Mearsheimer’s work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, contributed to the compendium of realist 
theory by building on the foundations of realism, more distinctly, structural realism. His approach, coined 
offensive realism, parallels the established tenets of structural realism, but departs by asserting that a state’s 
“uncertainty about other state’s intentions creates an irreducible fear among states that leads to power-
maximizing behavior”; see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 43. 
196 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 43; Stewart, American Military History, 53–
72. 
197 “The UN in Brief,” UN.org, accessed September 15, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/Overview/uninbrief/about.shtml. 
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The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with 
each other, for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and 
their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, 
against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on 
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever.198 
Whether one examines the failures of the Articles of Confederation of the 18th Century or 
examines the apparent inefficacy of the United Nations in the 21st, the absence of a 
central coercive authority in a governmental system tends itself toward anarchy—which 
may be the primary intent of Patriot Militia leaders.199 
D. THE SDFS IN CONTRAST TO THE PATRIOT MILITIAS 
SDFs, in contrast to the Patriot Militias, are legitimate organized militias that are 
established through state legislation and serve at the request of the governor and the 
Adjutant General within their respective states. The role of the SDF is primarily 
explained in its respective mission statement. In this section, SDF mission statements are 
contrasted with Patriot Militia mission statements to reveal what their leadership 
considers to be their raison d’être.200  
The Tennessee State Guard (the Tennessee SDF) has a clearly defined mission 
statement that outlines its chain of command and explains their role with regard to the 
National Guard: 
The purpose of the Tennessee State Guard is to provide a professional 
complement of personnel to support the State mission of the Tennessee 
National Guard, by assisting the Tennessee Army National Guard as a 
force multiplier, and at the direction of the  Adjutant General, to assist 
civil authorities with disaster relief, humanitarian causes, ceremonial 
service, religious and medical support for the well-being and safety of the 
citizenry of Tennessee.201  
198 U.S. Articles of Confederation, art. III. 
199 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 43; Stewart, American Military History, 46–
105. 
200 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The 21st-Century Militia.” 
201 “The All-Volunteer Tennessee State Guard.”  
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The goal of the Tennessee SDF is to assist the governor in maintaining social 
order when called upon to do so—of course, order is the antithesis of anarchy.202  
The Michigan Volunteer Defense Force has a similar mission statement: “The 
Michigan Volunteer Defense Force (MIVDF) at the direction of the Adjutant General 
provides reliable personnel support to local and state agencies during declared 
emergencies.”203 SDFs’ mission statements are quite dissimilar to those of Patriot 
Militias; e.g., the Michigan Militia.204 
The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) is a group that identifies extremist 
militia groups. The SPLC are “dedicated to fighting hate and bigotry and to seeking 
justice for the most vulnerable members of our society.”205 In 2011, they identified 1,274 
militias, which they consider to be “anti-government ‘Patriot’ groups.”206 The Michigan 
Militia is listed as one of these groups, and its credo is, “A well-armed citizenry is the 
best form of Homeland Security and can better deter disasters, crime, invasion, terrorism, 
tyranny.”207 Note the antagonism toward the Department of Homeland Security and the 
nostalgic connection to the word tyranny to imply that the group is connected to the 
founders of the U.S. who fought for freedom to gain independence from the tyranny of 
King George. According to the Michigan Militia’s website, the following militias are part 
of the Michigan Militia: 208  
• The Superior Unorganized Michigan Militia 
• The Southwest Michigan Volunteer Militia 
• The Liberty Militia Riding Club 
• The Michigan 3 Percenters 
202 Ibid. 
203 “Michigan Volunteer Defense Force,” mivdf.org, accessed November 22, 2014, 
http://mivdf.org/site/. 
204 Ibid.  
205 “Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in the United States in 2011.”  
206 Ibid.  
207 “Michigan Militia: Defending against Disaster, Crime, Invasion, Terrorism and tyranny.” 
Michiganmilitia.com, accessed March 10, 2015, http://www.michiganmilitia.com/ 
208 “Active ‘Patriot’ Groups in the United States in 2011.”  
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• Michigan Home Guard 
• Northern Michigan Volunteers 
• Illinois Sons of Liberty 
• Northwest Lower Michigan Civil Defense 
• Downriver Volunteer Militia 
• Black Creek Volunteers 
• Michigan Militia Corps Wolverines 
• Southeast Michigan Volunteer Militia209 
Within the mission statement of the above Patriot Militia known as the Superior 
Unorganized Michigan Militia, there are clear references to the Declaration of 
Independence, the Michigan Constitution, and the U.S. Constitution. These statements in 
themselves appear to be patriotic; however, there are undertones of antifederalist 
philosophy within the text. Note the state-centric language: 
The mission of the Superior Unorganized Michigan Militia (SUMM) is to 
watch over and defend our great Peninsula from all enemy’s [sic] both 
foreign and domestic who would challenge our God given right to Liberty 
and Freedom as defined in our Constitution. It is stated in the 
Constitution of our Great State of Michigan; ‘Every person has a right to 
keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the State.’ We will 
defend our lands and property from all those who attempt to usurp our 
freedom, liberty and property, and give aid to our fellow citizens in time 
of need.210 
The mission statement continues and becomes more inflammatory, and even implies the 
use of violence if the leadership finds reason to do so, which parallels the violence used 
by the colonials against despotic British rule. Note that there is no mention of the 
authority of Michigan’s governor or Adjutant General; even more, note the underlying 
theme of revolution. Again, from The Declaration of Independence, “That to secure these 
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed, —That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive 
209 “Michigan Militia.” 
210 “Superior Unorganized Michigan Militia,” superiorunorganizedmichiganmilitia.weebly.com, 
accessed November 22, 2014, http://superior-unorganized-militia.weebly.com/index.html.  
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of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.”211 Note that the militia 
will perform its lawful actions “nonviolently so long as there remains legitimate Civil 
Order [sic]”: 212 
Within this mission we will train in defensive actions, audit government 
actions regarding our freedom, observe fair and free elections, study and 
uphold the ‘Rule of Law’ as stated in our constitution. We will perform 
these actions lawfully and nonviolently so long as there remains legitimate 
Civil Order in our society. A well regulated (trained) Militia has been and 
will be necessary to maintain our freedom. To this end we organize and 
train for a time when we may be needed to aid our fellow Michigan 
citizens in disaster relief or the protection of our liberty’s [sic]. We 
prepare for the worst and pray that time never comes.213 
Although SUMM may believe it is being well intentioned and patriotic, there is a 
Michigan Volunteer Defense Force that is under the command of the Michigan Adjutant 
General, who serves at the request of the Michigan Governor and is legitimized through 
jurisprudence. This force can serve under the legitimacy of law and aid their fellow 
citizens and not return to a time when individual states were preeminent and the federal 




211 “The Declaration of Independence.”  
212 “Superior Unorganized Michigan Militia.” 
213 Ibid. 
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